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I. INTRODUCTION 
Forfeiture is a tactic that has been employed in the enforcement of drug laws 
in the United States continuously for 150 years. Opium, the original opioid1 and 
the first prohibited drug, was the expensive commodity at the center of legal 
disputes over drug-related forfeitures from the mid-1800s. More or less 
summary seizure of valuable property from drug offenders, especially of drugs 
themselves2 and of vehicles, has consistently yielded revenue for enforcement 
 
 * Visiting Assistant Professor of Journalism, Miami University. PhD in history, Ohio 
State University. The author wishes to thank David Stebenne, Stephen Siff, and Amy Coyner 
for their comments on drafts of this article; Kathleen German and Emily Dufton for fruitful 
and encouraging conversations about it; the Ohio State Law Journal for hosting the 
symposium that led to the article, and the journal’s editors for many improvements to it; 
archivists at the Bancroft Library of the University of California-Berkeley and at the National 
Archives and Records Administration for research assistance; and the Department of Media, 
Journalism & Film at Miami University for summer writing salary.  
 1 The word opioid, though much more recently coined, is interchangeable with opiate, 
both historically meaning any preparation derived from or containing opium or that produces 
similar sedating, dulling effects. See Opioid, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004); 
Opiate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004).  
 2 Although “[e]veryone knows that the law denies people property rights in illegal 
drugs and other contraband,” Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 
YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 (2016), this article assumes that the forfeiture of such property is worth 
consideration. Prohibited drugs in particular are extraordinarily valuable by weight, and their 
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agencies and generated publicity for campaigns of drug prohibition. The U.S. 
Treasury’s use of forfeiture, originally for tax collection and then for drug and 
alcohol prohibition, helped fund and expand its enforcement agencies. Local 
and state governments have also employed statutory forfeiture in drug control 
with similar results.3 Prohibitionists and enforcers have long partnered with 
willing media outlets to showcase dramatic, high-value forfeitures, coverage 
that appeals to the retributive and moralistic impulses of readers and supports 
the prohibitive project.4 
The ethical and moral problems with forfeiture statutes have only fully 
reached the public sphere over the past twenty-five years or so. Forfeiture has 
been dubbed “policing for profit,”5 said to lead to “constitutional kleptocracy”6 
and to amount to “forfeiting our property rights.”7 These arguments have not 
fallen upon deaf ears. In February 2019, the Supreme Court unanimously 
reversed the state of Indiana’s forfeiture of a vehicle seized from a man 
convicted of selling heroin, incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment to the states and enabling the defendant to build a defense 
against the $42,000 forfeiture upon that right.8 Justice Thomas in 2017 had 
critically described how civil forfeiture has developed into a tool for law 
enforcement to collect numerous small payouts from the marginalized and 
defenseless.9 He questioned whether the legal status quo on the “broad modern 
forfeiture practice can be justified by the narrow historical one.”10 
But the historical practice was not so narrow. Far prior to the statutory 
forfeiture expansions of the 1970s and 1980s, vast amounts of personal property 
were confiscated and then destroyed, sold, or pressed into service by 
government agents in the course of enforcing drug laws.11 The use of civil 
 
status as contraband or nuisance is not innate, but rather shifts according to where and by 
whom they are owned. 
 3 See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Evidence Considered in Tracing 
Currency, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent to Illegal Drug Trafficking so as to Permit 
Forfeiture, or Declaration as Contraband, under State Law—Explanation or Lack Thereof, 
4 A.L.R. 6th 113 (2005) (reviewing state court forfeiture cases). 
 4 See, e.g., ‘Lady Day’s’ Car May Be Seized, PITT. COURIER, Nov. 11, 1950, at 1. 
 5 See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden 
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 42 (1998) (“[L]aws have become especially 
punitive to drug offenders and increasingly profitable to the law enforcement 
agencies . . . .”). See generally Jerome H. Skolnick, Policing Should Not Be for Profit, 7 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 257 (2008) (responding to Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, supra 
note 5).  
 6 See generally Stefan B. Herpel, Toward a Constitutional Kleptocracy: Civil 
Forfeiture in America, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1910 (1998) (providing an extended review of 
LEONARD LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY (1996)).  
 7 See generally HENRY J. HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR 
PROPERTY SAFE FROM SEIZURE? (1995) (detailing the use of forfeiture law to seize property).  
 8 See Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091, slip op. at 1−2 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2019). 
 9 See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017). 
 10 Id. at 850. 
        11 See infra Parts IV, VI. 
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forfeiture in rem as opposed to criminal forfeiture in personam has merely 
exacerbated this problem, by routinizing the confiscation of assets in drug cases 
and expanding the reach of enforcers beyond offenders themselves. Civil and 
administrative proceedings that deprive people of property even when they are 
not found guilty have inspired special outrage, but forfeitures as penalties and 
remedies for crimes are also problematic. The history of this scattered body of 
drug law, and especially of its enforcement, is not well understood. Even the 
earliest such laws liberally granted proceeds of forfeitures to enforcement 
agencies and their personnel.12 As courts upheld forfeitures and enforcers’ 
adoption of seized wealth, an entrepreneurial spirit lay hold in drug control. 
Forfeiture became a solution to the problem of a public that desired a 
government tough on crime but light on taxation. Aided by a self-interested 
press, this same public washed its hands of the high human cost of such 
enforcement, instead eagerly consuming unsympathetic narratives and images 
that framed forfeiture as just desserts for an immoral caste.  
II. FORFEITURE AS REVENUE COLLECTION IN FOUNDING-ERA STATUTES 
The historical connection between drug-related forfeiture and revenue 
generation is clear, for the former originated in federal tax law. The first 
Congress codified forfeiture in order to enforce collection of import duties and 
excise taxes on domestic products, which were then the only sources of revenue 
for a government deep in debt.13 Perhaps because forfeiture in rem was deeply 
rooted in England’s methods of revenue collection,14 the first Congress drew on 
forfeiture both as a penalty for smuggling and as a means of securing money 
owed to the United States.15 Moreover, Congress and the Treasury devised a 
structure of financial incentives for informers and seizing officers that 
encouraged zealous enforcement of the revenue laws. Customs collectors were 
empowered from their creation to board and search any ship and to open and 
search packages on suspicion of any attempt to defraud the revenue; and could, 
with a warrant, enter and search private property on land where they suspected 
smuggled goods were kept.16 The first customs laws called for forfeiture of ships 
and vessels only under specific circumstances: for landing merchandise worth 
more than $400 at night or without the collector’s permission;17 for fraudulently 
receiving a drawback for exportation and then delivering the goods to another 
U.S. port;18 or for landing dutiable goods anywhere except the designated 
 
        12 See infra Part II.  
 13 See Nelson Dingley, Jr., The Sources of National Revenue, 168 N. AM. REV. 297, 
298−99 (1899).  
 14 Nelson, supra note 2, at 2457−60. 
 15 Id. at 2468. 
 16 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 23–24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (repealed 1790). 
 17 Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 39. 
 18 Id. § 34, 1 Stat. at 46. 
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ports.19 Bringing dutiable foreign goods into the country overland meant 
forfeiture of the goods “together with the carriages, horses, and oxen, that shall 
be employed in conveying the same.”20 Procedures were set for advertising and 
auctioning forfeited merchandise and ships21 and for dividing proceeds among 
the U.S. Treasury, the collector himself, other seizing officers, and informers, if 
any.22  
The first Congress also laid a contentious internal tax on distilled spirits and 
set out a system of districts and personnel for enforcing collection.23 Removing 
untaxed spirits from a distillery could trigger their forfeiture “together with the 
cask or casks containing, and the horses or cattle, with the carriages, their 
harness and tackling, and the vessel or boat with its tackle and apparel employed 
in removing them.”24 It authorized the seizure of untaxed liquor “found in the 
possession of any person,” the possession itself being “presumptive evidence 
that the [spirits] are liable to forfeiture”;25 and divided the proceeds of 
forfeitures between the Treasury and “the person or persons who shall make a 
seizure, or who shall first discover the matter or thing.”26 This so-called 
Whiskey Tax was repealed in 1801, reinstated from 1813 to 1817, then repealed; 
and no internal federal taxes were again levied until the Civil War.27  
Although opium in various forms had been available in apothecaries’ shops 
and among general merchandise since colonial times, its consumption by early 
Americans apparently was neither robust nor recreational (unlike distilled 
spirits, which they consumed in large quantities).28 For the first century of 
American independence, opium was a valuable, highly concealable commodity 
that became contraband when smuggled—much like silk, diamonds, and other 
sumptuary goods. In 1790, opium was subject to an ad valorem import duty of 
7.5%, and in 1794, of 12.5%; it was duty-free from 1816 to 1828, when a 15% 
duty was imposed.29 In 1832, the opium duty was abolished along with that on 
many other items as part of a general reduction in the tariff.30 Congress imposed 
a specific duty of 75¢ per pound on opium in 1842, modified to 20% ad valorem 
 
 19 Id. § 40, 1 Stat. at 48−49.  
 20 Id. § 40, 1 Stat. at 49. 
 21 Id. §§ 36–37, 1 Stat. at 47−48. 
 22 Act of July 31, 1789, § 38, 1 Stat. at 48. 
 23 Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 4, 1 Stat. 199, 199−200. 
 24 Id. § 19, 1 Stat. at 204. 
 25 Id. § 28, 1 Stat. at 206. 
 26 Id. § 44, 1 Stat. at 209. 
 27 See TUN YUAN HU, THE LIQUOR TAX IN THE UNITED STATES 1791–1947, at 30−35 
(1950). 
 28 In 1860, “production of whiskey was one of the chief industries of the nation, and 
the still . . . an almost necessary appendage to every farm.” FREDERIC C. HOWE, TAXATION 
AND TAXES IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM 1791−1895, at 
137 (1896).  
 29 S. DOC. NO. 22-24, at 10 (1832).  
 30 Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, § 3, 4 Stat. 583, 590. 
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in 1846 and $1 per pound in 1861.31 Such rates were in line with those on 
imported liquors and other foreign luxuries, with a view to generating revenue 
rather than protecting American trade or banning harmful substances.32 Ship 
passengers, particularly the Chinese immigrants who arrived to the United 
States beginning in the mid-19th century and brought along their opium 
smoking habit, continuously smuggled the compact and expensive article into 
the country.33 In 1853, the appraiser at the San Francisco custom house wrote 
the Secretary of the Treasury that packages of duty-free goods “require as much 
examination as the dutiable; for in the cheap and free articles we frequently find 
opium and other valuable articles concealed in tea, sugared pork, or Chinese 
vegetables.”34 Yet most smoking opium probably continued to enter the country 
legally, imported in bulk by early-arriving Chinese merchants who paid the 
customs duty and then sold their countrymen’s favored brands at retail in small 
amounts, enough for daily use.35 The tariff did not yet distinguish between crude 
opium and the more expensive refined opium for smoking, creating an 
opportunity for importers to pay a relatively low duty on the priciest brands. 
III. ANTI-CHINESE, ANTI-SMUGGLING, AND THE FIRST PROHIBITIVE 
DRUG TAX  
On the West Coast, as the local distaste for Chinese immigrants grew, so 
did the public scorn for opium smoking. At the same time, the Civil War was 
greatly increasing the national debt, and Congress in typical fashion sought 
relief by raising import duties. Yet lawmakers were beginning to recognize the 
need to balance higher rates of taxation against the resulting incentive to evade. 
So when, in 1862, a revised tariff separated smoking opium from crude opium 
and taxed the former at 80% ad valorem (increased to 100% in 1864),36 the 
likely intent was to effect a prohibition of this odd foreign habit, and thereby to 
inconvenience Chinese immigrants.37 Such result could be had while avoiding 
 
 31 S. DOC. NO. 54-219, at 112, 125, 142 (1896). 
 32 See, e.g., id. at 113 (detailing the rates for spirits and other luxury items).  
 33 See, e.g., Celestial Frauds: Smuggling Opium—Ingenious Expedients, S.F. CHRON., 
Nov. 9, 1869, at 3 (describing various smuggling methods). 
 34 H.R. DOC. NO. 33-74, at 135 (1854). 
 35 See ELIZABETH SINN, PACIFIC CROSSING: CALIFORNIA GOLD, CHINESE MIGRATION, 
AND THE MAKING OF HONG KONG 200 (2013).  
 36 S. DOC. NO. 54-219, at 183, 212. 
 37 No other article in the tariff of 1862 is subject to an ad valorem rate of 80% or more; 
neither are any articles except opium taxed at 100% in 1864. Id. at 178–95, 202–18 (1896). 
The Congressional Record contains no discussion of either increase in the opium duty. 
However, it does contain debate over Congressman August Sargent of California’s failed 
attempt to amend the 1862 tariff to discourage Chinese immigration, by raising the duty on 
cleaned, or milled, rice, the bulk of which imports in the state were consumed, he said, by 
Chinese immigrants. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2938 (1862) (“[The Chinese] 
are, as a class, characterized by vicious habits; and the State would be very glad to get rid of 
them altogether. In smoking opium and in intoxicating themselves with other drugs, they 
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damage to American manufacturers of morphine—needed to treat wounded 
soldiers—and other therapeutic preparations of opium including patent 
medicines.  
At the end of the Civil War, a Radical Republican Congress enacted the 
Smuggling Act of 1866 as a way to both pay down the war debt and to flex the 
United States’ muscles against external threats in an uncertain geopolitical 
environment.38 Thereafter a prohibitive tax on smoking opium desired by one 
state, California, was bolstered by federal law via extravagant customs 
enforcement powers. The Smuggling Act’s provisions for searching, seizing, 
arresting, and using force, along with those established by a concurrent 
modification of the internal revenue law, set the tone for federal policing of 
drugs and alcohol for decades to come. The Act gave broader authority to 
members of an enlarged force of personnel39 to board any vessel and to “inspect, 
search, and examine the same, and any person, trunk, or envelope on board, and 
to this end, to hail and stop such vessel if under way, and to use all necessary 
force to compel compliance.”40 If it appeared that any goods or merchandise 
were subject to forfeiture, any member of this force could seize the property and 
the vessel and could arrest or pursue “any person engaged” in the violation.41 
Furthermore, enforcers of the new customs law could apprehend and examine 
“any vehicle, beast, or person on which or whom he or they shall suspect there 
are goods, wares, or merchandise which are subject to duty or shall have been 
introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law” and could 
“search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which [they] may have a 
reasonable cause to suspect there are goods which were imported contrary to 
law,” and when finding such goods, should seize them.42 Furthermore, 
Every such vehicle and beast, or either, together with teams or other motive-
power used in conveying, drawing, or propelling such vehicle, goods, wares, 
or merchandise, and all other appurtenances, including trunks, envelopes, 
covers, and all means of concealment, and all the equipage, trappings, and other 
 
have, by their carelessness, set fire to their own wooden houses, and been the cause of the 
destruction of many of our towns. . . . In morals and in every other respect they are obnoxious 
to our people. The women are prostitutes and the men petty thieves. But how can we keep 
them out?”). Sargent later chaired committee hearings about Chinese immigration during 
which he brought up opium smoking dozens of times. S. REP. NO. 44-689, at 92, 130, 133, 
211 (1876). See generally DIANA L. AHMAD, THE OPIUM DEBATE AND CHINESE EXCLUSION 
LAWS IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN WEST (2007) (examining how the spread of 
opium smoking and its culture fueled anti-Chinese propaganda).  
 38 See Andrew Wender Cohen, Smuggling, Globalization, and America’s Outward 
State, 1870–1909, 97 J. AM. HIST. 371, 379−80 (2010).  
 39 Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 2, 14 Stat. 178, 178 (empowering “any officer of the 
customs, including inspectors and occasional inspectors, or of a revenue cutter, or authorized 
agent of the Treasury Department, or other person specially appointed” by customs and naval 
officials). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id.  
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appurtenances of such beast, team, or vehicle shall be subject to seizure and 
forfeiture . . . .43 
The Act provided fines and imprisonment for smuggling activities and for 
refusal to submit to a search, and penalized any person who “shall receive, 
conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, 
or sale” of goods once imported, and called for the forfeiture of those items.44 
A defendant’s possession of such items “shall be deemed evidence sufficient to 
authorize conviction, unless the defendant shall explain the possession to the 
satisfaction of the jury.”45 Proceeds from the forfeiture of seized goods, vessels, 
and vehicles were to be distributed according to a 1799 law on customs 
collection.46 
The increased authorization to search and seize people and property, along 
with increases in the tariff and economic incentives for enforcers, engendered 
widespread fraud and corruption in short order.47 After San Francisco collectors 
seized a large cargo of openly landed opium for a minor undervaluation, an 
editorial in one local paper fretted that federal efforts to nurture trade between 
the western U.S. ports and China risked defeat by a “vicious system of revenue 
laws, which throws the import trade into the hands of a class of spies and 
informers, who, for personal profit, pervert the plain intentions of the law.”48 
Grift was common and did indeed seem to perpetuate the very same frauds on 
the U.S. revenue that the law had aimed to mitigate. Treasury Special Agent 
John McLean reported to Congress an 1868 incident during which customs 
personnel seized a large shipment of smuggled opium, stashed in the ceilings 
above various state rooms, on a ship from China.49 Instead of reporting the haul 
as a single seizure, they divided it into small ones worth less than $500 each,50 
which entitled them to divide the proceeds from the opium’s sale without first 
remitting the unpaid duty to the Treasury.51  
 
 43 Id. § 3, 14 Stat. at 178.  
 44 Id. § 4, 14 Stat. at 179. 
 45 Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 38, § 4, 14 Stat. 178, 179.  
 46 Id. § 31, 14 Stat. at 186. By terms of the Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 91, 1 Stat. 
627, 697, after deducting the costs of litigation and sale, remaining funds were split into 
moieties, or equal parts, and sometimes further divided among enforcement personnel. 
Under ordinary circumstances, half was paid to the Treasury and half was divided between 
the collector, naval officer, and surveyor. Id. But if an informer not employed by the 
government gave information leading to the forfeiture, he was to receive half of the half 
normally split between the officers, and the officers were to split the remaining quarter; and 
generous provisions were made for the officers of revenue cutters who made seizures leading 
to forfeiture. Id. 
 47 See Cohen, supra note 38, at 382−84 (describing the extent and variety of smuggling 
and official corruption after 1866, such as the collection of $316,700 in moieties over three 
years by a single Treasury agent). 
 48 Editorial, The China Trade—Seizures, DAILY ALTA CAL., Mar. 15, 1867, at 2. 
 49 S. REP. NO. 41-47, at 108–09 (1870). 
 50 Id.  
 51 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 188, § 1, 14 Stat. 546, 546. 
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On the West Coast, the new style of tough customs enforcement resulted in 
continual harassment of passengers arriving from China as federal and local 
agents sought to make high-value opium seizures. Beginning in 1867, San 
Francisco newspapers regularly carried advertisements for custom house 
auctions dominated by numerous lots of seized opium, some in large quantities 
and some reflecting multiple smaller seizures from individual passengers.52 The 
rough and invasive searches of Chinese immigrants caught the attention of 
newspaper reporter Mark Twain, who had spent most of the 1860s in California, 
growing increasingly outspoken about anti-Chinese prejudice.53 In 1870 he was 
contributing a column to The Galaxy magazine for which he wrote a series of 
satirical letters from a fictional Chinese immigrant to a friend at home.54 In one 
installment, the Chinese traveler describes his arrival at the port of San 
Francisco, where a small packet of opium becomes a pretext for officials to 
confiscate all his belongings and arrest his companion: 
I stepped ashore jubilant! I wanted to dance, shout, sing, worship the generous 
Land of the Free and Home of the Brave. But as I walked from the gang-plank 
a man in a gray uniform* kicked me violently. . . . I was about to take hold of 
my end of the pole which had mine and Hong-Wo’s basket and things 
suspended from it, when a third officer hit me with his club to signify that I 
was to drop it, and then kicked me to signify that he was satisfied with my 
promptness. Another person came now, and searched all through our basket 
and bundles, emptying everything out on the dirty wharf. Then this person and 
another searched us all over. They found a little package of opium sewed into 
the artificial part of Hong-Wo’s queue, and they took that, and also they made 
him prisoner and handed him over to an officer, who marched him away. They 
took his luggage, too, because of his crime, and as our luggage was so mixed 
together that they could not tell mine from his, they took it all.  
 
*Policeman.55 
At this time, the American press was awash in “cheap print” following the 
rapid proliferation of inexpensive periodicals to a highly literate public that 
delighted in crime news and salacious reporting.56 California workers, hackles 
raised toward the cheap Chinese labor force as the gold rush petered out and the 
economy contracted, could vicariously enjoy the custom agents’ games of cat 
and mouse by reading the news. Coverage of opium arrests and seizures 
reflected casual racism mixed with a keen fondness for intrigue and vice. 
 
 52 See, e.g., Notice to Claimants, DAILY ALTA CAL., Jan. 3, 1868, at 2. 
 53 See Mark Twain, Goldsmith’s Friend Abroad Again (1870), reprinted in COLLECTED 
TALES, SKETCHES, SPEECHES, & ESSAYS 1852–1890, at 455, 455–65 (Louis J. Budd ed., 
1992). 
 54 See id. at 457. 
 55 Id. at 457. 
 56 See PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS 123–39 (2004).  
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Readers were especially fascinated by Chinese passengers’ methods of opium 
concealment, as in this 1869 news account of Chinese arrivals to San Francisco: 
Almost every conceivable method has been adopted by the smugglers to elude 
the vigilance of the revenue force. Opium has been brought from China 
concealed in tea chests, braided in the cues of immigrants, secreted in birds’ 
nests and hidden in the soles of the elegant Chinese shoe. Elaborately 
constructed beetles of monstrous size, apparently preserved specimens in 
natural history, have been discovered to be made almost entirely of opium. 
Eggs have been broken whose yolks were great compact boluses of the narcotic 
drug, sufficient to get fifty Celestials as drunk as a poppy seed vessel on the 
ocean in a typhoon. Cigarettes have been found which contained opium instead 
of tobacco. Dried fish have been found stuffed with it, and we are not sure that 
a mummified-looking old Celestial, so dried up that he looked as if he might 
be a first cousin to the sun and had held a place of trust near King Sol’s person, 
who was carefully carried in a hack from the China steamer, not long since, 
was not the solidified extract of the poppy ingeniously constructed into an 
automaton.57 
News accounts often drew on stereotypes and poked fun at the immigrants. 
For example, after describing how Treasury agents had discovered Chinese 
passengers disguising wax-covered, egg-shaped brass vessels filled with opium 
as “pickled eggs,” a writer for the San Francisco Call commented:  
These are the kind of eggs with which John settles his coffee, or makes a 
Mongolian omlete. [sic] What a sleepy hen it must be that lays such an egg! 
The question arises, will its chicken pipe its note now as usual since the 
seizure? We are not sure whether it is of the Shanghai stock.58  
An 1881 article in the San Francisco Examiner relayed an unnamed customs 
officer’s ramblings:  
The worst smugglers, and the ones that give us the most trouble, are the 
Chinese. I don’t mean the raw coolies, fresh from Canton, who don’t know the 
difference between the violation of the revenue laws and the common breaking 
of one of the commandments, but the old hands who have made two or three 
voyages. . . . Raw and manufactured silks, pearls, ivory ornaments, Chinese 
drugs and opium are the principal articles they attempt to smuggle. As for the 
first-named articles we have no trouble in detecting their presence, as they are 
bulky and awkward to stow away, except about the person, and we always 
search them down to their measly, yellow hides. Opium is what troubles us.59  
 
 57 Celestial Frauds, supra note 33, at 3.  
 58 A Cunning People, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL, June 4, 1864, at 1. 
 59 The Dead Smuggler, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 1, 1881, at 3. 
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This article ended with a grisly tale of the officer’s discovery of smuggled opium 
in the stomach of a corpse brought ashore by two Chinese men who had hacked 
off its legs and stowed it in a trunk.60  
IV. SEIZING THE OPIUM: ENFORCEMENT, CORRUPTION, AND THEIR PRESS  
The smoking opium most beloved by the Chinese in California was made 
by expert “cookers” in Hong Kong from crude opium produced in India.61 
Congress targeted smoking opium with prohibitive import duties from 1862; at 
the hands of California senators and congressmen, often using the language of 
temperance, duties on smoking opium were pushed ever higher, at one point 
reaching $12 per pound when the going price was around $7.62 Importers 
worked around the tariff by allowing their opium to be seized by customs and 
then buying it at auction for a price well below the duty, an arrangement that 
benefited local customs officers.63 Employees of the auction house selling 
seized opium in San Francisco were suspected of colluding with a Chinese 
“opium ring” to sell at just above the government’s minimum price but later 
exchange it for slightly more, keeping the difference instead of their 
commission.64 Due to these and other workaday frauds at ports across the 
country, Congress passed an Anti-Moiety Act that limited rewards to customs 
personnel and informers and required the funds to be channeled through the 
Treasury.65  
Before long, enterprising Chinese in San Francisco were preparing their 
own smoking opium from raw opium, which was subject to a much lower tariff 
because it was used by pharmaceutical firms to manufacture morphine.66 In 
1880, the United States entered into a treaty with China in which each agreed 
that its own citizens would not be permitted to trade in opium at any port of the 
other, and the Treasury instructed collectors in San Francisco to seize and forfeit 
any opium imported by any Chinese national.67 Several wholesalers and bankers 
soon began importing opium and selling it to Chinese merchants, pocketing a 
tidy profit.68 Also in 1880, Congress placed an excise tax on the domestic 
production of smoking opium, and the Treasury issued an onerous booklet of 
regulations that included registration and specifications for “factories,” which 
were required to be open to federal inspectors at all times; a $5000 bond to 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 See SINN, supra note 35, at 191, 194. 
 62 S. DOC. NO. 61-377, at 81−83 (1910).  
 63 See, e.g., Shady Opium Deals, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1893, at 10. 
 64 See The Opium Auctions, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 27, 1893, at 8. 
 65 Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 2, 18 Stat. 186, 186.  
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procure a license, which could only be had by American citizens; and affixing 
stamps to each package after paying $10 per pound in excise.69 Not a single 
license was issued, and the Treasury collected no taxes.70 Illicit domestic opium 
refinement, or “cooking” of banned crude opium, was so successful in San 
Francisco that one of the largest and most sensational seizures made at that port 
involved American merchants colluding with a customs inspector to smuggle 
locally made smoking opium out of the city on a boat to Hawaii.71 In the case 
that unfolded, the owner of the goods intervened to have the seized opium 
returned on the grounds that he had not in fact been smuggling opium into the 
country.72 Although evidence presented at the trial tended to prove the 
petitioner’s version of facts and that customs agents had apparently fabricated 
parts of their story to help secure the forfeiture, the opium was forfeited because, 
as the judge wrote, civil cases need not be proven beyond reasonable doubt.73 
Journalists did not ignore the bad behavior at the custom house. Many in 
California had a nuanced view of the opium problem and looked warily to both 
Congress and to local governments for solutions. In 1879, discussing a proposed 
municipal anti-opium ordinance, the editors of the Los Angeles Herald 
approvingly quoted a contemporary writer in support of their argument that 
opium dependence should be confronted with medical rather than legal 
remedies: 
If philanthropy and law have failed to abolish alcoholic drunkenness, law will 
assuredly fail to abolish opium eating, for law is a gauze barrier against the 
attack of money, and the druggist who will not sell the most profitable article 
of his stock because a legislature forbids, is a man above the average of 
tradespeople. If such a [prohibitive] law were passed, a special policeman 
would have to be placed in every drug store to watch the druggist, and a 
detective to watch the policeman—but who should watch the detective? Even 
detectives will take money, drink whiskey and eat opium.74 
The editors of the San Francisco Chronicle wrote that it was common 
knowledge that very high duties encouraged smuggling.75 Gone were the days 
of the smuggler as a romantic figure in European literature, the editors wrote, 
where the low, black lugger is chased by the King’s ship, and the goods are 
landed at night and concealed in some cave or secret chamber unknown to the 
 
 69 U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, NO. 16, REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE TAX ON OPIUM 
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 70 The Sticky Drug, S. F. CALL, Jan. 7, 1893, at 7. 
 71 See Three Thousand Eight Hundred and Eighty Boxes of Opium v. United States, 23 
F. 367, 369, 373 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883). 
 72 Id. at 376.  
 73 Id. at 395−96. 
 74 The Abuse of Opium, L.A. HERALD, May 18, 1879, at 2. 
 75 Opium Smuggling, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 1888, at 4. 
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revenue officers; but here, where a meek-eyed Mongol hides away a box or 
package of prepared opium under his coat or in his box, and is ignominiously 
hauled about and poked here and there until it is found, there is nothing 
romantic about it. All the romance nowadays consists in catching some Custom 
house officer dividing the plunder with the smuggler and seeing his attempts 
to get out of the meshes of the law.76 
V. THE STATE’S ELECTIVE ROLE IN PROHIBITING DRUGS AND ALCOHOL 
California’s statewide regulation of opium and cocaine sales began early, in 
1891, when the legislature passed a Pharmacy Act requiring a pharmacist’s 
license to “conduct any pharmacy or store for dispensing or compounding 
medicines,”77 commanding pharmacists to record buyers’ names and sale 
amounts of scheduled drugs, including opium,78 and creating a seven-member 
board of pharmacy charged with issuing licenses and investigating infractions.79 
In 1907, a state Poison Act prohibited the sale of morphine, codeine, heroin, 
opium, and cocaine without a prescription;80 in 1909, lawmakers added cannabis 
(as “Indian hemp”) to the schedule of poisonous drugs requiring labeling and 
record-keeping,81 outlawed possession of opiates and cocaine without a 
prescription,82 and forbade doctors to prescribe them to “habitual users.”83 
Amendments in 1913 made it a crime to possess pipes and other paraphernalia 
for smoking opium as well as “extracts, tinctures, or other narcotic preparations 
of hemp, or loco-weed.”84 This version also authorized “any peace officer” to 
seize prohibited opiates, hemp, and paraphernalia, requiring judges to condemn 
such seizures and deliver them up to the pharmacy board, which could in turn 
destroy them or dispose of them “either by gift to the medical director of 
California state prisons or state hospitals or by sale to wholesale druggists, the 
funds received from such sales to be applied by the board of pharmacy to the 
carrying out of the provisions of this act or the [Pharmacy Act].”85 In an early 
example of codified “equitable sharing,” fines and forfeited bond money would 
be divided between the state pharmacy board and the city or county enforcement 
agency in a 75/25 split.86 
The pharmacy board drafted local officers into their raiding parties and 
seized opium and paraphernalia in the course of arresting Chinese smokers as 
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 77 Pharmacy Act, ch. 85, § 1, 1891 Cal. Stat. 86, 86. 
 78 Id. § 10, 1891 Cal. Stat. at 89.  
 79 Id. § 6, 1891 Cal. Stat. at 87. 
 80 Poison Act, ch. 102, § 8, 1907 Cal. Stat. 124, 126. 
 81 Act to Amend the Poison Act, ch. 279, sec. 3, § 7, 1909 Cal. Stat. 422, 423−24.  
 82 Id. sec. 4, § 8, 85 Stat. at 424. 
 83 Id. sec. 4, § 8, 85 Stat. at 425.  
 84 Act to Amend the Poison Act, ch. 342, sec. 6, § 8(a), 1913 Cal. Stat. 692, 697. 
 85 Id. sec. 7, § 8(b), 1913 Cal. Stat. at 697–98. 
 86 Id. sec. 4, § 7, 1913 Cal. Stat. at 694. 
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well as doctors, druggists, and other drug sellers and users.87 In 1922, the value 
of a seizure in San Francisco was placed at more than $1500 and described like 
this: 
The confiscated outfit included everything from opium, yen shee and yen pock 
to pipes, els to scrape the pipes and “gee rags,” which are used in the pipe bowl 
to prevent air from entering. Little peanut oil lamps with glass guards and 
trimming scissors were also seized, together with devices used for cooking 
opium. A delicate pair of scales of ivory and brass was also seized.88 
In 1923, a state narcotics inspector posed for a newspaper photograph with 
seized drugs arranged much like a store window product display, under the 
heading, “Dope From Many Raids Shipped North.”89 The drugs, reportedly 
valued at $30,000, had been seized by Los Angeles police during the month of 
February 1923.90 The newspaper explained: “After being used as evidence 
against peddlers and addicts, on whom they were found, the drugs are issued to 
hospitals and State institutions by the Pharmacy Board.”91 The article was 
printed next to an account of a raid by the city’s “hop squad,” under the state 
inspector’s command, on a Chinatown “opium den,” where the team seized 
$1700 in “narcotics, together with a number of pipes and other furnishings of 
the place.”92 This seizure entailed a pursuit “through devious passages and up a 
short, narrow stairway, but the fleeing addicts had escaped to the roofs of the 
adjoining buildings.”93 To illustrate the story, one of the officers lay on a cot 
beside a table of paraphernalia, pipe to his lips, to pose as an opium smoker for 
a photograph.94  
Even when seized drugs could not be sold for a profit, their public 
destruction could serve as a deterrent to future crime and satisfy prohibitionists 
that enforcement was effective. Pharmacy board agents frequently made a 
public spectacle of destroying seizures by burning piles of collected opium and 
paraphernalia in the street.95 As early as 1912, a San Francisco newspaper 
printed a photograph of a crowd gathered around a pyre under the headline “Old 
Sam Sing Beholds a Holocaust for His Good.”96 The bonfire was built from 
$40,000 in “opium and utensils” and attended by eight pharmacy board 
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 91 Id. 
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 95 See, e.g., $25,000 Dope Raid-Seized, Up in Smoke, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 7, 1921, at 
15. 
 96 Pharmacy Board Inspectors Burn on Street Opium and Utensils Worth $40,000, S.F. 
CHRON., May 10, 1912, at 18. 
872 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:4 
members, including the president, and one inspector, all named by the reporter, 
who wrote: 
Sutherland deluged the pile with kerosene and McKown applied a match. 
In an instant the flames leaped thirty feet into the air. The costly pipes crackled 
and curled into strings of charcoal, the opium began to burn and a dense black 
pungent smoke arose. 
 
Then a strange thing happened. Some wise and charitable gust of wind 
swirled a great plume of the black smoke toward the window, where Sam Sing 
sat gazing at the flames like an astounded and grief-stricken mummy.  
 
The dream laden smoke enveloped his old head.97  
News items about the burning of drugs commonly appeared in cities, usually 
noting the value of the destroyed contraband in dollars. “That heavy pall of 
smoke drifting over Police Headquarters, Manhattan, late this afternoon was 
caused by a fire fed with $100,000 worth of narcotics, opium pipes and other 
material seized during the past three months by members of the police narcotic 
squad,” read one account.98 “The material is fed to the flames gradually, on a 
clear and breezy day, for it is probable that too much smoke from the burning 
habit forming drugs might have a tendency to bring pleasant dreams to those 
who might inhale the flames too deeply.”99 In 1913, a federal judge ordered both 
the destruction and sale of property seized in Terre Haute, Indiana, from two 
Chinese men, neither of whom appeared at the hearing.100 Items to be destroyed, 
according to the local newspaper, included:  
five pounds of cooked opium, four pounds of boiled gum opium, seven gallons 
of opium extract, one bag of gum opium, twenty pounds of gum opium boiled, 
twenty-five empty powdered opium cans, one quart jug of unknown contents, 
one two-gallon can, one twenty-five-pound tin can, one twenty-five-pound 
empty opium can, one two-gallon stone jar, a one-gallon crock and eight cans 
of different sizes.101 
To be sold: “brass and copper kettles, jars, spring scales, dipper, sieve and a 
gasoline stove.”102  
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Police Burn $100,000 in Seized Narcotics, STANDARD UNION (BROOKLYN, N.Y.), 
Jan. 16, 1930, at 2. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Orders Opium Destroyed, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 17, 1913, at 3. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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VI. FORFEITING GUILTY AND INNOCENT VEHICLES  
The widespread forfeiture of automobiles for drug infractions began as soon 
as average Americans could afford to drive them. In 1921, the California 
legislature amended the Poison Act to enable “any duly authorized peace 
officer” to seize as evidence any automobile “used by or with the consent or 
knowledge of the owner thereof, to unlawfully convey, carry or transport any 
cocaine, morphine, heroin, or opium.”103 Upon conviction of the driver, a seized 
car was to pass through the hands of the state board of control, which “shall 
deliver to the state board of pharmacy such number of said machines as may be 
needed by the board of pharmacy in enforcing the provisions of this act.”104 The 
provision for forfeiture of a vehicle upon conviction for violating the state’s 
drug laws was similar to that in the new federal law for enforcing national 
Prohibition.105 On referendum, California voters had both passed these 
forfeiture amendments to the poison act and defeated a state alcohol prohibition 
act.106 However, the state’s legendary resistance to alcohol prohibition was 
broken once federal agents began enforcing the Volstead Act. On Election Day 
in 1922, at least one newspaper printed a report from the head of federal 
prohibition in California: Enforcement there had netted the United States more 
than $1.5 million in “seizures, taxes, fines and other penalties” during October 
alone, while costing only about $22,000 including salaries.107 Statistics for the 
record-setting month, the official said, showed 46 automobile forfeitures, 
$123,207 in taxes and fines, and 903 arrests.108 California voters that day passed 
the Prohibition Enforcement Act,109 enabling the state to field its own profitable 
enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment. 
The National Prohibition Act situated federal enforcement in the Treasury, 
which created a Prohibition Bureau to manage the impossible task of forcing 
millions of Americans to give up their booze.110 The Treasury’s long history of 
collecting excise taxes on alcoholic beverages inclined it toward forfeiture as an 
enforcement tactic,111 but Congress had placed some safeguards in Section 26, 
which provided for vehicle forfeiture.112 The loss of a vehicle used to transport 
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or conceal alcohol was a criminal penalty upon conviction rather than a separate 
civil process, and “innocent owners” such as finance companies holding liens 
on seized cars were protected from losing their interest.113 But within a few 
years, the Bureau began testing a new strategy of bringing forfeiture 
proceedings under the Internal Revenue Code, which had been used since 1866 
for enforcing the liquor tax.114 U.S. attorneys drew on the internal revenue law 
to prosecute automobiles in rem for removing, depositing, or concealing un-
taxpaid alcohol rather than attempting to adopt the vehicles under the Volstead 
Act’s newer provisions.115 The courts, while circumscribing this practice to 
some extent, never completely barred the Bureau from doing so.116 The number 
of cars seized by federal prohibition agents increased each year from 1920 (209 
cars) to 1933 (12,222 cars).117  
Meanwhile, Congress had banned importation of non-medicinal opium in 
any form in 1909118 and then in 1914 had passed the so-called Harrison Act, an 
internal revenue law that required registration with the Treasury and payment 
of a tax in order to possess, buy, or sell any form of opium or cocaine.119 
Customs already had been enforcing the opium ban, but enforcement of the 
Harrison Act was uncertain until it was folded into the new Prohibition 
Bureau.120 In practical terms this union meant that both drugs and alcohol were 
policed together by federal agents. But the narcotics division was far less 
successful with forfeiting automobiles under the Internal Revenue Code; after 
just a few years, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Section 3450 of 
the Revised Statutes could not be applied to Harrison Act forfeitures.121 
Thereafter the division sought to apply Sections 3061 and 3062 of the Revised 
Statues—customs forfeiture provisions dating from the 1866 Smuggling Act—
to narcotics forfeitures, reasoning that the vast majority of smoking opium, 
opium derivatives, and cocaine found in violation of the Harrison Act would 
necessarily have been imported illegally.122 In order to avail themselves of the 
customs laws, the narcotics agents had to turn the cars over to customs collectors 
 
 113 See id.  
 114 Murchison, supra note 111, at 427−28.  
 115 Id. at 428. 
 116 Id. 
 117 BUREAU OF INDUS. ALCOHOL, U.S. TREASURY, STATISTICS CONCERNING 
INTOXICATING LIQUORS 95 (1933). The numbers for each year from 1921 to 1932 are 706, 
1886, 3977, 5214, 6089, 5935, 7137, 6934, 7299, 8633, 8499, and 11,833. Id.  
 118 Act of Feb. 9, 1909, ch. 100, 60 Stat. 614, 614. 
 119 Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, ch. 1, §§ 1–12, 63 Stat. 785, 785−90 (1914). 
 120 See Audrey Redford & Benjamin Powell, Dynamics of Intervention in the War on 
Drugs: The Buildup to the Harrison Act of 1914, 20 INDEP. R. 509, 511–12 (2016) (noting 
the difficulty of drug enforcement prior to the adoption of the Harrison Act). 
 121 United States v. Mangano, 299 F. 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1924). 
 122 See Memorandum from R.C. Valentine, Head of Law Division, Bureau of Narcotics, 
to Mr. Anslinger, Comm’r, Bureau of Narcotics 1, 9−10 (July 21, 1932) (on file with 
National Archives & Records Administration, RG 170, Subject Files, Box 47) [hereinafter 
National Archives].  
2019] BURN, SELL, OR DRIVE 875 
to be forfeited; moreover the customs statute did not work exactly like the 
internal revenue statute, requiring an uncomfortable period of adjustment.123 
For example, while the language of the Harrison Act made possession of the 
newly illicit substances without a doctor’s prescription presumptive evidence of 
guilt, that language applied only to a criminal proceeding.124 The crucial 
element in forfeiture proceedings under the customs laws, on the other hand, 
was establishing probable cause for the initial seizure.125 Narcotics agents had 
to convince judges that they knew a suspect’s car contained narcotics imported 
contrary to law, or that the suspect knew them to be illegally sourced.126 Other 
enforcement matters also arose. According to the language of the customs law, 
the contraband would have to be found inside the car at the time of the search, 
and the seizure would have to be made on the spot.127  
Yet seizures of drugs, alcohol, and cars continued apace, with federal agents 
from all corners of the Treasury setting the tone with a brusque and merciless 
style of enforcement. The press did not report on prohibition raids in order to 
inspire outrage over hidden motives or strongarm tactics. Rather, they aimed at 
readers’ retributive and moralistic impulses in a distinct genre of tales about 
dangerous rascals who got their comeuppance. In a brief on the 1922 seizure by 
Memphis police of “narcotic drugs, imported whisky [sic] and automobiles 
valued at almost $35,000,” the reporter, though failing to list the names of those 
detained, provided this bit of local color: “In one house raided, where two stills 
were located, the walls of the room used for distilling purposes, were covered 
with framed Biblical passages.”128 Reading these un-bylined stories a century 
later, other striking elements are the overreliance of reporters on law-
enforcement sources and the lack of curiosity about suspicious assertions. This 
introduction to a 1921 news report captures the breathlessness of media 
coverage of cooperative raids that often captured drugs, alcohol, and property—
and could result in death:  
Eighteen Federal agents in a raid at 5 o’clock yesterday morning seized 
narcotics and liquor said to be worth $1,000,000, shot at least five Greek 
sailors, blackjacked about twenty more, made 327 prisoners, and seized a 
15,000-ton ship, the King Alexander, anchored alongside Pier 22, at the foot 
of Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn.129  
The article grows wilder from there, relating how customs officers, excluded 
from the raid due to suspicions of collusion with the smugglers, fired on the 
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narcotics agents from the shore; how the alleged ringleader of the smugglers 
disappeared overboard with $34,000 cash; how customs and narcotics agents 
quarreled over custody of the captured drugs afterward; how narcotics agent and 
squad commander Frank J. Fitzpatrick had committed suicide one hour after the 
raid, in the washroom of the ferry house, by shooting himself in the heart; and 
how the raid had commenced after a narcotics agent had arranged to purchase 
some of the drugs, but then not having enough cash, used money “composed of 
$1000 bills said to have been formed by cutting 0s out from ten-dollar bills and 
pasting two of them after each $10 on genuine ten-dollar bills.”130  
While deaths were only occasionally reported, the undercover drug 
purchase was a staple element of raid accounts.131 In a San Francisco item 
published in 1922: “Federal narcotics agents, posing as ‘drug dealers,’ yesterday 
seized 598 bottles of cocaine, with a market value of more than $5000, together 
with two valuable automobiles, and arrested four persons on charges of violating 
the Harrison narcotics act.”132 In 1927, the Washington Post reported that 
federal narcotics agents had seized eleven cars registered to a single owner, 
August Scontrino, after he reportedly agreed to sell $62,500 worth of morphine 
to undercover agents.133 This seemed to justify a sweeping seizure of the man’s 
property:  
Scontrino carried an automatic. A search of the house revealed four more 
automatics and 25,000 rounds of ammunition. Five touring cars, the license 
plates of which revealed that they were the property of Scontrino, were found 
in the block. Six other automobiles were found listed under the same name. 
Officers said the fleet of automobiles was used in transporting narcotics 
throughout the South.134  
Two San Diego police officers joined a state narcotics agent on an undercover 
operation in 1930.135 They bought forty-five dollars’ worth of heroin from a 
woman using marked bills; followed her home, where they searched her house 
and found more heroin; and confiscated her car, where they said the drug sale 
had taken place.136  
The Treasury embraced inter-agency cooperation in a series of large-scale 
raids. In 1926, according to the Associated Press, “forces of secret service men, 
narcotic inspectors and prohibition agents cooperated” in Miami-area raids 
netting thirty-five arrests and the confiscation of eight automobiles, one truck, 
and two boats as well as 9600 quarts of liquor.137 The windfall in automobiles 
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and contraband was also shared across departments, particularly for law 
enforcement purposes; this snapshot of vehicle seizures, auctions, and adoptions 
by Treasury bureaus was offered in support of allowing the Department of Labor 
to receive forfeited cars “for use in the enforcement of the immigration laws”:  
Under the act of March 3, 1925, vessels or vehicles summarily forfeited to 
the United States may be used for customs or prohibition enforcement and 
forfeitures by decree of court, upon application to the Secretary of the Treasury, 
may be delivered to the Treasury Department for the same purpose, in lieu of 
being sold under existing law.  
 
During the fiscal year 1927, 1,293 automobiles were seized by customs 
patrols, of which 215 were retained for customs use, 185 were transferred to 
the Bureau of Prohibition, and 454 were sold at public auction. The balance of 
these seizures were either returned or being held as a result of litigation. Those 
sold at auction brought in proceeds of $46,760.  
 
The Bureau of Prohibition used 541 confiscated automobiles during the 
same fiscal year in the enforcement of the national prohibition act and the so-
called Harrison Narcotic Act. The seizures totaled 7,137 automobiles and the 
net proceeds from those sold were $105,093.65.138 
One result, perhaps, of the practice of prosecuting liquor law violators under 
the revenue laws was that enforcement did not stop once Prohibition ended. The 
Alcohol Tax Unit continued to seize thousands of cars yearly; customs 
enforcement work, too, continued apace.139 One broad post-repeal enforcement 
effort involved the Alcohol Tax Unit, the Bureau of Narcotics, and customs 
across multiple cities, as the New York Times reported: “Hurling the full strength 
of an enforcement army of nearly 12,000 men against law violators, the 
Treasury delivered a crushing blow today to counterfeit, illicit distilling, 
narcotic and smuggling rings in one of the most spectacular drives of its kind 
ever staged.”140 The agents had arrested 1909 people over the course of a single 
day and were still arresting more.141 “Property valued at hundreds of thousands 
of dollars was seized. This included automobiles, boats, illicit stills, distilled 
spirits, narcotics and jewelry.”142 Customs alone had seized property worth $1.5 
million, according to the reporter.143 “There were many unusual seizures, 
including horses and other live stock [sic], grain, flour, potatoes, beans, wool, 
hides, . . . fish, and, in Montana, a stump puller.”144 The Alcohol Tax Unit 
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seized “851 stills, 37,450 gallons of spirits and 110 automobiles.”145 As another 
writer framed the 1935 cooperative enforcement:  
From land, sea and air, combined forces of the Coast Guard, Secret 
Service, Internal Revenue, Intelligence Unit, Customs Bureau and Alcohol Tax 
Unit struck at every part of the underworld over which the Treasury has 
jurisdiction.  
 
After 72 hours of almost unceasing warfare without precedent in American 
police annals, bootleggers, drug dealers and counterfeiters everywhere could 
count these among their losses: 
 
Nearly $2,500,000 tossed into the lap of Uncle Sam in the form of fines 
and seizures; 44,662 gallons of liquor taken out of illicit circulation; more than 
$1,000,000 in bogus bills and the paraphernalia for making that many more 
destroyed; the wreckage of an illegal rum-making industry capable of 
producing 219,866 gallons a day.146 
Some instances of federal drug enforcement ending in automobile forfeiture 
now appear aimed at particular people and particular cars. In the Territory of 
Hawaii in 1937, federal narcotics agents arrested 32-year-old Beatrice Adams, 
along with nine other women, after raiding their Honolulu apartment 
building.147 Apprehended July 13, Adams was charged with possession, 
transportation, and concealment of narcotics, posted bond on July 14,148 and was 
indicted by a grand jury for possession of 155 grains (about a third of an ounce) 
of opium on August 26.149 On September 4, her dead body was found at the foot 
of a cliff and subsequently identified at the morgue by narcotics officers.150 The 
more credulous and sensational of the competing major Honolulu dailies 
reported that Adams’ fear of being busted for “white slavery” had led her to 
jump to her death.151 “Persecution in the form of ostracism from her former 
underworld associates may have been the dominating factor in the suicide of the 
woman, according to opinions expressed in federal law enforcement circles 
today,” read the account.152 “Since the raid on the Rose Rooms by narcotics 
officers several weeks ago, she had been harassed by other women of the 
underworld who blamed her for putting them ‘on the spot,’ a federal officer 
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said.”153 More likely, Adams had been targeted by narcotics agents because of 
her local popularity as a night club performer under the stage name Zola 
Knight.154 What had not been reported was the government’s seizure of 
Adams’s 1937 Packard convertible, a libel against which was filed the day of 
her indictment.155 Although the criminal drug charge was dismissed after she 
died, the civil suit went forward, with the government asking the court to turn 
over her car for use by the head of the narcotics division in Honolulu.156 Both 
the finance company holding a lien on the car and Adams’s brother, who had 
also been arrested by narcotics agents, contested the forfeiture (although her 
brother did not appear in person, having agreed to leave the island as part of a 
plea bargain for a suspended prison sentence).157 The claimants protested the 
U.S. attorney’s presenting as evidence a note Adams was supposed to have 
written confessing that she had used the car to transport the opium; but the judge 
allowed it, so the U.S. attorney asked for a directed judgment on whether the 
agents had probable cause to seize the car.158 The answer was yes.159 Perhaps 
flustered by this turn of events, both claimants’ lawyers failed to discharge the 
burden of proof thus laid upon them to establish the dead woman’s innocence 
and thereby that of her late-model convertible.160 A jury found for the United 
States.161  
In 1950, a Pittsburgh newspaper reported that jazz singer Billie Holiday’s 
“snazzy $5,000 Lincoln” had been seized in San Francisco.162 “The royal blue, 
specially built sedan, topped by a cream-colored leatherette top, was 
impounded” after her chauffeur was arrested for drug possession.163 A follow-
 
 153 Id. 
 154 The initial newspaper report listed Beatrice Adams as one among ten women 
arrested, but as Zola Knight she occupied the lead and the headline of subsequent coverage, 
even before her death. Id. Her brother, James Byron Adams, arrested and charged with drug 
possession on the same day, had recently performed in a community theater production of 
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up piece in the same paper six months later read, “Billie Holiday’s $5,500, royal 
blue Lincoln sedan—which makes Gov. Earl Warren’s Cadillac look very 
mediocre—has been officially awarded to the state of California.”164 The 
chauffeur had been sent to the state prison at San Quentin.165  
VII. ROUTINIZING AND BUREAUCRATIZING AUTOMOBILE FORFEITURES  
In 1952, political columnist Peter Edson described automobile forfeiture as 
a “standard government practice . . . few people know about,” poking fun at a 
federal administrator who “was driven up to the White House the other day in a 
snazzy blue Cadillac.”166 When some reporters asked the official about the car, 
the man explained that “the government—and the taxpayers—didn’t buy this 
car for him. It was seized by the Treasury’s Bureau of Narcotics agents from 
some big dope peddler.”167 Edson, in extensive syndication based on his ability 
to put government jargon into plain language, explained, “[w]henever an 
automobile is seized in the arrest of anyone for violation of federal law, the car 
is held in custody of the U.S. marshal until a court issues an order for its 
disposition. The seizing agency has a right to requisition the car if it wants it.”168  
Indeed, Treasury forfeiture of cars was routine to the point that bureaucrats 
included it in their budgets and sometimes eyed its expansion as a source of 
additional revenue.169 Frederick Evans, a finance officer for the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue, told Congress in 1951 that he anticipated replacing 100 cars 
in the department’s aging fleet of 1,380 with late-model forfeitures over the 
coming year.170 Senator Harley Kilgore wanted to know more about the 
Treasury’s request to purchase new cars; Evans replied that the Bureau “has 
been endeavoring to meet its needs by seizing cars and having them forfeited to 
the Government for official use,” but that the cars it seized increasingly were 
too old and worn to adopt.171 Dwight Avis of the Alcohol Tax Unit helped 
explain: 
As Mr. Evans has indicated, while our seizures of automobiles are rapidly 
reaching the prewar level of approximately 2,000 a year, yet a great part of 
those cars are what you might call junk.  
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In other words, the cars are old. They have over 40,000 and 50,000 and 60,000 
miles on them when we seize them, and some of them much more. Many of 
them are 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940 models.  
 
Senator KILGORE. It is not like the prohibition days when you used to pick up 
Cadillacs, is it?  
 
Mr. AVIS. It is not like before the war, Senator. An automobile costs so much 
money today. We have some difficulty in acquiring cars. The courts are much 
more apt to return the car to the finance company, where there is a lien of, say, 
$1200 or $1500 on it. That complicates our problem.  
 
Senator KILGORE. You also have this long-time credit proposition, which you 
did not have before, and cars used to be liquidated in 12 months or so. Now 
they have a longer period of time to liquidate.  
 
Mr. AVIS. That is true, sir.  
 
Senator KILGORE. The bootlegger buys on the longest possible time. 
 
Mr. AVIS. Yes.172  
In 1955, Chester MacPhee, collector of customs at San Francisco, told a 
congressional committee that his area’s thirty-eight enforcement personnel 
should be tripled, but that the expense of new hires could be mitigated through 
enforcement.173 “A substantial portion of the cost . . . would be returned to the 
taxpayer as the results of fines and penalties from increased seizures, in addition 
to payments of duties on merchandise now brought in without such payments 
due to lack of proper coverage,” MacPhee said.174 “In addition, the war on 
narcotics would be intensified.”175 He explained that his thirty-eight agents 
made ten to twenty automobile seizures each year of cars brought in by boat and 
driven off the dock with smuggled alcohol or tobacco inside.176 Recently, for 
example, the discovery of a late-model car with $150 worth of liquor in the trunk 
fetched $600 in fines, he said, and: 
In addition to that, of course, they forfeit the vehicle. That vehicle comes into 
the custody of the Government. It is used by the General Services 
Administration or the Treasury Department in another assignment or that [car] 
might very well be sold by the United States marshal and that money turned 
into [sic] the Treasury Department. . . . If we had adequate personnel to do this 
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job there is one instance where we might double or triple that thing, where the 
revenue would come into the country for the personnel we use.177 
Also, MacPhee said, his agents routinely caught and fined cigarette smugglers, 
then gave the seized contraband away to veterans’ hospitals.178  
State and local drug warriors were also busily forfeiting cars in the 1950s. 
In October 1952, according to a newspaper report, 283 cars were seized and 
forfeited in southern California while 73 others were “impounded on suspicion 
but later released.”179 After running through fifteen forfeiture claims in a single 
day and finding for the state in each case, Los Angeles Superior Judge Frank G. 
Swain explained that “‘one pill, or a cigarette butt in an ash receiver can be 
evidence to send the responsible driver or car owner to jail, and to impound the 
car for forfeiture proceedings.’”180 Hiding narcotics in a car, the reporter added, 
is “simply an invitation for a search.”181 Judge Swain explained the court’s 
understanding of the statute’s intent:  
We believe the law which provides for forfeiture of cars used in illegal 
narcotics traffic is a deterrent to such traffic . . . . Persons involved know the 
penalty is losing the car. I’ve heard more than one person say, “I can do six 
months standing on my head, but I hate to lose my car.”182  
A far cry, in its implementation, from depriving large-scale drug traffickers 
of the instruments and profits of their crimes, such forfeiture harmed ordinary 
people. In 1956, Wadie Shaheen, a resident of a working-class neighborhood in 
southern Los Angeles, wrote a letter to his councilman about his 19-year-old 
son, Bob.183 Arrested in possession of marijuana, Bob had spent a month in the 
San Diego County Jail and then had been transferred to a youth work camp after 
his conviction.184 The events, Wadie wrote, were “an unfortunate blow to his 
Mother and myself who have raised four children in a decent and upright manner 
as decent citizens”; moreover, it was the first time any of their children had run 
afoul of the law.185 But, Wadie wrote, the Shaheens took consolation in knowing 
not only that Bob had learned his lesson but that they themselves had gained an 
education on “such a very bad condition that is sweeping our Country.”186 The 
only remaining problem was that the state had impounded the family car, a 1955 
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Mercury that Bob had been driving when he was arrested, on which the 
Shaheens still owed $2400.187 He wrote:  
[W]e feel that our boy is paying his penalty and we hope that the State can 
consider our side of the story as we are ordinary working people and can ill 
afford to lose the car and the equity we have in it. Our son has co-operated with 
the Authorities in every way and we are looking forward to the time when he 
will be back out of this predicament and we can help him rehabilitate himself 
and get back to a normal life and we also need the car to carry on his and our 
working conditions. We feel we have suffered enough and hope the Court will 
be kind enough to help us retain our car.188 
The Shaheens’ hope would prove vain, even though the councilman, Don 
Allen, wrote a sincere personal plea to California Attorney General Edmund 
“Pat” Brown, Sr., asking him to release the car to the family.189 “I am sure the 
law is made on the basis of justice and equity,” Allen wrote, but, “It seems rather 
cruel. . . . I know the family’s condition and they just cannot afford to go ahead 
and pay the balance of $2400 on that car and then not to have its use. They are 
just not that kind of people.”190 Moreover, Allen wrote, the father “went all out 
to see that the boy cooperated 100% with your people. . . . The boy, through the 
counsel of his father, also has shown his willingness to aid and assist the law, 
after seeing the enormity of the situation.”191 In a memo to Brown about the 
councilman’s letter, Assistant Attorney General Frank Mackin also referred to 
cooperation; Mackin had arranged for Bob to meet with two state narcotics 
agents, but Bob “had no helpful information to give them” and the agents were 
“definitely opposed, naturally, to returning the car” because it had been used to 
transport seven pounds of cannabis, presumably to sell, from Tijuana, 
Mexico.192 “We are filing on and forfeiting cars all the time where a few 
[marijuana] cigarettes are found in the car—sometimes hardship cases on the 
parents,” Mackin wrote.193 In turn responding to Allen, Attorney General 
Brown wrote, “I think you should know that the law intends that innocent 
persons should sometimes suffer, as they probably do in this case. This is done 
because narcotics are such a horrible thing.”194 
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That pretty much everyone in 1950s California agreed about the horrible 
nature of drug trafficking and addiction could hardly be overstated. Rarely does 
public opinion coalesce so completely around stamping out a perceived social 
ill through whatever measures can be taken at a reasonable cost to taxpayers. 
But this exchange of letters reveals how expensive assets were also used as 
leverage to turn drug defendants into informants. The effort to extract 
information from Bob Shaheen through his father, who stood to owe $22,000 in 
today’s dollars195 on the seized car unless the narcotics agents could be satisfied, 
was viewed by bureaucrats as justified by the state’s wartime footing.  
In May 1958, Attorney General Brown’s office wrote to the state director 
of finance to ask permission for the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement to use 
forfeited cars instead of state-issued cars “for stake-outs, as meeting places with 
dealers, addicts and underworld characters, and for the tailing and pursuing of 
other automobiles.”196 In addition to their drab appearance, the state’s standard 
four-door sedans manufactured by Ford, Chevrolet, or Plymouth “have often 
been driven so many miles that proper tailing and pursuit [of suspects] is 
impossible.”197 The unremarkable cars had ruined good cases repeatedly: “Dope 
peddlers are, of course, very conscious that they might be dealing with law 
enforcement agents in their transactions,” a member of Brown’s staff wrote.198 
“Undercover agents tell of cases where peddler drivers of cars in which they are 
riding recognize a car following them as having the general appearance of a 
State car. This, of course, ends all negotiations for a narcotic purchase.”199 
Given that the “fine police art” of tailing suspects required cars both powerful 
and nimble, the letter suggested that the Bureau  
obtain its cars exclusively from forfeited vehicles which have been seized 
because of narcotic violations . . . . Selection would be made of flashy 
convertibles, hardtops and such other cars which are of the type generally used 
in the narcotic traffic, and which, in the opinion of the Bureau, would not be 
suspected. They would also be chosen for their get-away and power qualities 
so that they may cope with situations so frequently found in narcotics law 
enforcement.200  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Histories of drug policy offer convincing arguments that prohibition does 
not achieve the purported goal of curbing recreational drug use; rather, it serves 
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other hidden agendas.201 Yet each generation seems to convince itself and its 
lawmakers that the current moment is an unprecedented crisis of drug abuse. 
The detriments of opioids, while quite real, have always been misunderstood 
and exaggerated; and the supposed urgency of confronting “the drug evil”202 
has frequently provided a consensual pretext for unconstitutional policing and 
disproportionate penalties. Property rights are not the only rights affected by 
drug-related forfeitures, which violate the spirit of equal protection by exacting 
extraordinary penalties on some that cannot be had on others guilty of the same 
crime and by encouraging the arrest and prosecution of some offenders but not 
others. Used writ small for highly discretionary leverage over drug-involved 
citizens and writ large to increase enforcement capacity, forfeiture adds up to 
the great detriment of personal liberty. This problem, with its extensive history, 
manifests from day to day in interactions with city police and sheriff’s deputies. 
Americans have waited supportively for the improvements in public health and 
safety long promised by drug warriors. But if drug-related asset forfeitures have 
failed to secure them, and if instead such forfeitures primarily generate revenue 
for police forces and bolster public support for continued prohibition, then 
maybe forfeiture should be re-relegated to tax law.  
Certainly forfeiture’s use to collect taxes is firmly situated in the nation’s 
legal past, but the tax-as-prohibition arrangement has been rejected as 
unconstitutional.203 The problems with modern forfeiture have more to do with 
longstanding cultures of drug law enforcement—with the corruption and 
meanness of spirit that seem to spring from the daily grind of the drug wars. It 
would be better if the entire motivation for forfeiture was financial. But it is not; 
and neither is the penalty purely financial for those who experience it. 
Forfeitures are also pursued in order to inflict humiliation on offenders, to win 
leverage by placing family or friends in jeopardy, to offer the public misleading 
proof of effective enforcement, and so on. In today’s drug wars, the arbitrary 
peril of possible forfeiture of an automobile or of real estate is certainly 
analogous in nature to “tough” sentencing. While hearing the arguments in 
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Timbs v. Indiana, the Justices, laboring to compare the possible prison sentence 
for Tyson Timbs’ heroin-sale conviction to his Land Rover forfeiture in light of 
the Eighth Amendment, noted the difficulty of quantifying excessiveness in 
punishing his crime.204 Justice Alito asked how low “the ceiling of permissible 
term of imprisonment would have to go in order to justify a holding that a fine 
of $42,000 is a violation of the Eighth Amendment”; what, he asked, was the 
equation between dollars in a fine and time in a prison sentence?205  
When Indiana’s Solicitor General insisted that the Court must grapple with 
the history of civil forfeiture,206 he meant that legal precedents supporting the 
broad deployment of forfeiture by police should be honored. But in drug crimes, 
a whole set of nonlegal implications arises, including the diminished social 
status of drug users and truisms about the risks of drug involvement. Chief 
Justice Roberts himself remarked that Timbs’ car was “an instrumentality of the 
crime,” that he had used it to transport drugs to the place he sold them.207 
“Normally, I mean, you’re carrying the—the drugs in your car, I think it’s pretty 
well established your—your car can be forfeited.”208 But exactly why is this 
concept well established? Legal precedent reveals little about why enforcers feel 
entitled to profit from drug control, or why juries and judges find drug 
defendants unsympathetic. The whole history of drug prohibition, especially the 
troublesome cultures of enforcement it fosters, should be part of the 
conversation as lower courts begin to apply Timbs to the pressing question of 
disproportional punishments. Ideally the courts would employ similar 
considerations to pare back prison sentences for drug offenders as well.  
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